While the µ-calculus notoriously subsumes Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), we show that the epistemic µ-calculus does not subsume ATL with imperfect information (ATL i ), for the synchronous perfect-recall semantics. To prove this we first establish that jumping parity tree automata (JTA), a recently introduced extension of alternating parity tree automata, are expressively equivalent to the epistemic µ-calculus, and this for any knowledge semantics. Using this result we also show that, for bounded-memory semantics, the epistemic µ-calculus is not more expressive than the standard µ-calculus, and that its satisfiability problem is Exptime-complete. 
Introduction
The propositional µ-calculus (L µ ) [12] is a logic of utmost importance in theoretical computer science for several main reasons. First, it is a powerful logic that captures all ω-regular properties that are used for the verification of dynamic systems' behavioral properties. In particular, it subsumes all classic temporal logics, such as LTL, CTL and CTL * [6] . Second, it enjoys deep connections with several paradigms that play a fundamental role in modern approaches for the verification of reactive systems: it is equivalent to alternating parity automata [7, Chap. 10] , a powerful tool to design decision procedures for temporal logics. L µ is also closely related with parity games, which are central both for modeling the interaction of systems and for testing the satisfiability of temporal logics [7] . It can be used to specify strategic abilities in multi-player games [16] , and it subsumes logics of coalition and strategy like the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1] and Strategy Logic [5] . Finally, its connection with more classic logics is well understood as its expressive power coincides with the bisimulation invariant fragment of the monadic second order logic (MSO) [11] . While most results concern the perfect information setting in which players/agents know the actual state of the system, realistic applications led to consider agents that have to strategize based on a partial information of their environment. This need gave rise to a proliferation of frameworks to represent, reason about and/or strategize under imperfect information. There are basically two trends. One trend relies on extensions of previous strategic logics with additional constraints on strategic abilities of players, that forces them to strategize consistently with their available information. This is the case of variants of ATL with imperfect information like ATL i , ATL ir , ATLK or ATEL [9, 20, 17] -to cite only a few, see also [3] for a recent survey of the various logics of this type. The other trend is based on extensions of temporal logics with epistemic features, sometimes also combined with the concepts of the former. Such logics include Epistemic Temporal Logic [8] , epistemic mu-calculus L K µ , first introduced in [18] , and the epistemic alternating mu-calculus AMC [4] . Comparing the two trends is necessary to share expertise, and it is relevant to wonder whether L K µ has the same central position as the standard µ-calculus has in the perfect information setting. Some results are already known: the epistemic µ-calculus subsumes Epistemic Temporal Logic and Propositional Epistemic Dynamic Logic [18] , and a notion of Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus that considers one-step strategic abilities [4] . It is also known from [4] that ATL i is not subsumed by this Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus for a memoryless semantics with imperfect information.
Our contribution is threefold: first, we show that the epistemic µ-calculus has the same expressive power as the recently introduced jumping automata, an extension of alternating parity tree automata that allow for jumps between tree nodes [15] . The proof relies on the classic result that the modal µ-calculus is equivalent with alternating tree automata [7] Second, combining this general result with the fact that jumping automata equipped with recognizable relations between tree nodes translate in linear time into two-way tree automata [15] , we obtain two corollaries: for bounded memory semantics, (1) L K µ is not more expressive than L µ , and (2) the satisfiability problem for L K µ is Exptime-complete. Third, we prove that, unlike in the perfect information setting, ATL i is not subsumed by the epistemic µ-calculus: we consider the formula a Fp, which means that Alice has a uniform strategy (i.e. a strategy consistent with her observations) to eventually reach p, and we show that if a jumping automaton accepts all the (tree) models of this formula then it also accepts another model in which Alice only has a non-uniform strategy to achieve Fp. This result is proved for the synchronous and perfect recall semantics of indistinguishability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, first we introduce basic notations and we recall classic parity games as well as game bisimulations. We then expose the epistemic µ-calculus, ATL with imperfect information, and jumping tree automata. In Section 3 we prove that the epistemic µ-calculus is equivalent to jumping tree automata, from which we derive corollaries on the expressivity and the complexity of L K µ with bounded memory. Using again the correspondence between L K µ and jumping tree automata, we prove in Section 4 that ATL with imperfect information is not expressible in L K µ , and we conclude in Section 5, where we also comment on the impact of the results on the relationship between the epistemic µ-calculus and the monadic second order enriched with equal-level predicate (see e.g. [19] ).
Preliminaries
In this section we set some notations concerning infinite trees and parity games, and we recall the definitions of the three main objects considered in this paper: epistemic µ-calculus, ATL with imperfect information, and jumping tree automata. A tree is a nonempty set τ ⊆ N * such that if x · i ∈ τ , then x ∈ τ and x.j ∈ τ for all j < i, and if x ∈ τ , there exists i ∈ N such that x · i ∈ τ , and if x.i. The elements of τ are called nodes, and the empty word is the root of the tree. If x · i ∈ τ , x · i is a child of x. The arity of a node x is its number of children, and if every node of some tree t has arity at most k, τ is a k-ary tree. Given a node x of a tree τ , we let P aths τ (x) (or simply P aths(x)) be the set of infinite paths π = x 0 x 1 . . . in τ such that x 0 = x and for all i, x i+1 is a child of x i . Also, for a path π = x 0 x 1 . . . we let π[i] := x i . For two nodes x and y, y is a descendent of x (written x y) if x is a prefix of y, or equivalently if y can be found on some path that starts in x. We denote by τ ↓ x the subtree of τ rooted in x: τ ↓ x = {y | x y}.
Trees may be labelled with atomic propositions from a countably infinite set AP that we fix. For a finite subset AP ⊂ AP of atomic propositions, an AP -tree is a pair t = (τ, ), where τ is a tree and : τ → 2 AP is a labelling of the nodes. A node x in a tree is reached by a finite prefix ρ of a path in P aths( ), say ρ x = x 0 . . . x n with x n = x. We define the word of x, written w(x), by ( ) (x 1 ) . . . (x n ).
For simplicity, we may write x ∈ t instead of x ∈ τ . Finally, if t = (τ, ) is an APtree, p ∈ AP and S ⊆ τ , we define t[p → S] as the (AP ∪ {p})-tree t = (τ, ), where (x) = (x) ∪ {p} if x ∈ S, and (x) \ {p} otherwise. In other words, t[p → S] is the same tree as t, except that we make p hold exactly on nodes in S.
Parity games and game bisimulation
We define two-player turn-based parity games, that we use to define acceptance of trees by parity tree automata. We also define game bisimulations, recently introduced in [2] . . . a n−1 ∈ Σ * , its length is |u| := n. We define two-player turn-based parity games: A parity game arena is a tuple G = (V, E, C), where V is a set of positions partitioned between positions of Eve (V E ) and those of Adam (V A ). Binary relation E ⊆ V × V is a set of moves that we assume total, i.e.
* is a finite prefix of a play and it ends in v n . A strategy σ for Eve is a partial function σ :
, and similarly for partial plays. For a parity game G and a strategy σ for Eve in G, we denote by Out(G, σ) the set of outcomes of σ, that is plays in G that follow σ. A play π is winning for Eve if the least colour seen infinitely often along π is even, otherwise π is winning for Adam. A winning strategy for Eve is a strategy whose outcomes are all winning for Eve. Finally, as we only consider winning strategies of Eve, we say that position v of a game arena G is winning if Eve has a winning strategy in (G, v).
Berwanger and Kaiser introduce in [2] a notion of bisimulation between parity games and they prove that two bisimilar games are equivalent with regards to the existence of winning strategies 1 . This result will be crucial to establish our nonexpressivity result in Section 4. 
Epistemic µ-calculus
We fix Var = {X, Y, . . .} a countably infinite set of second order variables. Given a finite set of agents Ag, the syntax of the epistemic µ-calculus L K µ is defined by the following grammar:
where X ∈ Var, p ∈ AP, i ∈ Ag, and in the last rule X appears only positively (under an even number of negations) in ϕ(X). For a finite set of atomic propositions AP ⊂ AP, we denote by L K µ (AP , Ag), or simply L K µ when the parameters are irrelevant, the set of formulas of the epistemic µ-calculus that only use atomic propositions in AP and agents in Ag.
A model of a formula in L K µ (AP , Ag) consists in an AP -tree t together with a set of binary relations { i } i∈Ag over (2 AP ) * . In the following, for two nodes x and y in t, x i y stands for w(x) i w(y): two nodes are related by i if their node words are related by i . Intuitively, x i y means that when the current node is x, Agent i considers possible (up to her knowledge) that node y is the current node. Notice that the relation i is arbitrary and not necessarily an equivalence relation, as often assumed in epistemic logic. From now on, whenever Ag is clear from the context, { } will denote a relation profile { i } i∈Ag . Finally, interpreting a formula requires a valuation V : Var → 2 t ; also, given X ∈ Var and S ⊆ t, V [S/X] is the valuation that maps X to S, and is equal to V on all other variables.
The semantics of a formula ϕ ∈ L K µ (AP , Ag) on an AP -tree t = (τ, ) with relation profile { } and valuation V is the set of nodes ϕ t V ⊆ t defined as follows:
is a monotone function, and hence that its least fixpoint exists. µX.ϕ(X) t V is defined to be this fixpoint. If ϕ ∈ L K µ is a sentence, i.e. it has no free variables, its semantics is independent on the valuation, that we may omit from the semantics. For a sentence ϕ ∈ L K µ , a relation profile { } and a tree t, we write t, { } |= ϕ for ∈ ϕ t { } , and we let L(ϕ, { }) := {t | t, { }, |= ϕ}. Finally, we let L µ denote the sublanguage of L K µ obtained by removing the modalities K i , and simply write t, |= ϕ as relation profile do not play any role in the semantics of L µ -formulas; thus, for ϕ ∈ L µ we may use L(ϕ) = {t | t, |= ϕ}.
Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect information
We now recall the syntax and semantics of Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect information (ATL i ). Again, let Ag be a nonempty finite set of agents. The syntax of ATL i (Ag) is defined by the following grammar:
where p ∈ AP and A ⊆ Ag.
The semantics of ATL i is usually defined on concurrent game structures (see [1] ). These are transition systems with states labelled by valuations over some finite set of propositions AP , and where every transition is labelled by a compound action a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ), which is interpreted as Agent i ∈ Ag playing action a i during this transition. The imperfect information is usually introduced by letting each agent observe only a subset of AP , and by deciding whether agents remember the past during a play or not. This induces, for each agent, an equivalence relation between finite plays.
In order to make the comparison with epistemic µ-calculus easier, we instead define the semantics of ATL i on what we call tree-arenas: Definition 3. Let AP ⊂ AP be a finite set of atomic propositions, and for each i ∈ Ag, let Act i be a nonempty finite set of actions available to Agent i. Define Act := × i∈Ag Act i , and let AP act := {p a | a ∈ Act} where each p a is an atomic proposition not in AP . An (AP , Act)-tree-arena is an (AP ∪ AP act )-tree t = (τ, ) such that ( ) ∩ AP act = ∅, and for all x ∈ τ \ { }, (x) ∩ AP act is a singleton.
For the rest of this section, we fix a finite set AP ⊂ AP and a finite set of actions Act i for each agent i ∈ Ag. For an (AP , Act)-tree-arena t = (τ, ) and a node x ∈ τ , we write (x) = (v, a), where a ∈ Act is the unique (compound) action such that p a ∈ (x), and v = (x) \ {p a }. In addition, given a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ Act, a i will denote a i . Note that a tree-arena t can be seen as a concurrent game structure: take a node x ∈ t, and let (v, a) be its label. Node x can be seen as a state of a transition system, v as its label, and a as the label of the only transition reaching x. Concerning the imperfect information, similarly to the previous section, we introduce agents' uncertainty by means of binary relations { i } i∈Ag over (2 AP ∪AP act ) * . Conversely, the unfolding of every concurrent game structure with imperfect information can be seen as a tree-arena equipped with a relation profile. We now adapt the classic semantics of ATL to our setting.
First we need a few more definitions. Fix an (AP , Act)-tree-arena t and a relation profile { }. A strategy for Agent i is a function σ i : t → Act i , that defines the strategic choice of Agent i in each possible situation. Because agents have imperfect information, we classically require strategies to be consistent with the information of the agent: if σ i is a strategy for Agent i, we require that for each x, y ∈ t such that x i y, σ i (x) = σ i (y) (note that strategies satisfying this requirement are sometimes called uniform strategies [10] ). For A ⊆ Ag, we call A-profile a tuple σ A = (σ i ) i∈A where σ i is a strategy for Agent i, and given an A-profile σ A and i ∈ A, we let σ i A denote the strategy of agent i in σ A . The outcome of an A-profile σ A for some A ⊆ Ag is the set of behaviours that follow the strategies in the profile, defined as follows. For a node x of t, Out(x, σ A ) ⊆ P aths(x) is the set of paths π in t that start in x and such that for all
The semantics of an ATL i -formula ϕ with atomic propositions in AP is given with respect to an (AP , Act)-tree-arena t = (τ, ), a relation profile { } and a node x ∈ t:
for all y ∈ t, if x i y for some i ∈ A, then for all π ∈ Out(y, σ A ),
We define the following classic shorthands: := p ∨ ¬p, and A Fϕ := A Uϕ. Finally, for a formula ϕ ∈ ATL i , a set of (compound) actions Act and a relation profile { }, we let L(ϕ, Act, { }) := {t | t is a (Free(ϕ), Act)-tree-arena s.t. t, { }, |= ϕ}.
Remark. We consider here the most restrictive notion of "having a strategy", i.e. having a strategy "de re" [10] . However, the result that we prove in Section 4 still holds with less restrictive notions of strategies: "de dicto" strategies, or simply uniform strategies
Jumping tree automata
Jumping tree automata (JTA) were introduced in [15, 14] . Let Ag be a finite set of agents. For a set X, B + (X) is the set of positive boolean formulas over X, i.e. formulas built with elements of X as atomic propositions and using only connectives ∨ and ∧. We also allow for formulas and ⊥, and ∧ has precedence over ∨. Elements of B + (X) are denoted by α, β . . . 
The acceptance of an input tree t = (τ, ) by A equipped with a relation profile { } is defined on a two-player parity game between Eve (the proponent) and Adam (the opponent): let t = (τ, ) be an AP -tree, and let A = (Σ, Q, δ, q 0 , C). We define the game G 
where † ∈ {∨, ∧} and i ∈ {1, 2} (1)
Positions of the form (x, q, ) and (x, q, ⊥) are deadlocks, winning for Eve and Adam respectively. The colouring function C of G A t,{ } is inherited from the one of A: C (x, q, α) = C(q). A tree t is accepted by A with relation profile { } if Eve has a winning strategy in G A t,{ } , and we denote by L(A, { }) the set of trees accepted by A equipped with relation profile { }. If A is an alternating automaton (i.e. it only uses automata directions and ), it needs not be equipped by a relation profile to evaluate trees, and we write L(A) for the set of trees it accepts.
Remark. In general, JTA can identify children of a given current node and send different copies independently to each one of them. This ability is not always needed, but quantifying (existentially or universally) over children is sufficient. This is the case in this work, reason why we have presented here a symmetric version of jumping tree automata, just like symmetric alternating automata have sometimes been considered (see e.g. [13] ).
In the following, the size of a formula ϕ, written |ϕ|, is its number of subformulas, and the size of an automaton A, written |A|, is the size of its transition function (i.e. the sum of the sizes of formulas occuring in it).
Equivalence of jumping tree automata and epistemic µ-calculus
We show that JTA and L The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5 and to two corollaries. We rely on the classical equivalence between the multi-modal µ-calculus, written here L µ , and alternating tree automata, when interpreted over transition systems: A (multi-modal, AP -labelled) transition system is a tuple S = (Q, {R i } i∈I , V ), where Q is a set of states, I is a finite set of indices, for each i ∈ I, R i ⊆ Q × Q is a binary relation, and V : Q → 2 AP is a labelling function. We do not detail the semantics of the µ-calculus and alternating automata over transition systems, which is very similar to the one for trees (see [7, Chap. 10] Now we make observation that AP -trees are connected, acyclic, rooted transition systems with one relation. Also, an AP -tree t = (τ, ) together with a relation profile { i } i∈Ag over (2 AP ) * can be seen as a transition system S Theorem 5 has two important corollaries. First, let us recall some definitions and results concerning recognizable relations and jumping automata. Let Σ be a finite alphabet.
Definition 7. A relation
⊆ Σ * × Σ * is recognizable if there are two families of regular
For example, epistemic relations of agents whose memory can be represented by finite state machines are recognizable relations (see [14] ).
Given a recognizable relation , one easily shows that the language {w#w | w w } where # is a fresh symbol can be accepted by a finite-state word automaton; we let size of , written | |, is then the number of states of a minimal word automaton that recognizes the language {w#w | w w }.
Theorem 8. [15, 14] For every jumping automaton A equipped with a relation profile { }, if every relation i in { } is recognizable, then there is a two-way tree automaton A { } that accepts the same language, and such that |A { } | is polynomial in |A| + i∈Ag | i |.
Restricting attention to trees of bounded arity, we obtain the following two corollaries: Corollary 9. The satisfiability problem for epistemic µ-calculus with recognizable relations is Exptime-complete.
Proof. The upper bound follows from Theorem 5 together with Theorem 8 and the fact that, for trees of bounded arity, the emptiness problem for two-way tree automata is Exptimecomplete [21] . The hardness follows from EXPTIME-hardness of the satisfiability problem for standard µ-calculus.
Corollary 10. Epistemic µ-calculus with recognizable relations is not more expressive than (its fragment) the µ-calculus.
Proof. By Propositions 6, it suffices to show that for each epistemic µ-calculus formula ϕ interpreted with recognizable relations, there exists an alternating tree automaton that accepts the models of ϕ. Let ϕ ∈ L 
. Finally, by [21] , there is a non-deterministic (hence alternating) tree automaton
, which concludes.
Inexpressivity
In this section we prove the non-expressibility of ATL with imperfect information within the epistemic µ-calculus. We exhibit a formula of ATL i and a relation profile that has no equivalent in the epistemic µ-calculus evaluated with the same relation profile. Let AP = {p}, Ag = {a} and Act a = Act = {a 0 , a 1 }. We have AP act = {p a0 , p a1 }. Assume that Agent a is synchronous blindfold, i.e. she observes nothing but the occurence of moves. Her indistinguishability relation on (AP , Act)-tree arenas is therefore ⊆ (2 AP ∪AP act ) * , defined by w w if |w| = |w |. Consider the formula a Fp ∈ ATL i (Ag). We prove that there is no formula of the epistemic µ-calculus that is equivalent to ϕ with regards to the singleton relation profile { }. More formally:
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 11. Assume towards a contradiction that there is a formula Act, ) . By Theorem 5, there is a jumping automaton A such that L(ϕ , ) = L(A, ). Let A = (AP ∪ AP act , Q, δ, q 0 , C), and let N = |Q| + 1.
We build 2 N tree-arenas in which the formula a Fp holds. In each of them, the objective Fp is attained with a different uniform strategy. We exhibit, for each tree, a winning strategy in the acceptance game of A on that tree, and then we employ the "pigeon hole" principle to show that at least two of these strategies can be combined into a new strategy that accepts a new tree-arena, in which the only strategy for a to ensure Fp is not uniform.
We describe the family of tree-arenas that we consider (see Figure 1 ). Concretely we only describe finite trees, infinite trees are obtained by adding loops on leafs and unfolding the obtained graphs. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2 N }, the tree t i = (τ i , i ) is such that: 1. The root does not verify p: i ( ) = ∅ 2. In , Agent a can only play a 0 . Through this action she can move to 2 N +2 different children. The first 2 N ones verify p, but not the last two ones. Formally, τ i ∩ N = {0, . . . , 2 N + 1}. For readability, we call x m+1 the node m for each m ∈ {0, . . . , 2 N + 1} (see Figure 1) .
N + 2, the subtree t i ↓ x k is a full binary tree of height N in which each non-leaf node x x k has a left child, accessed through a 0 , and a right child, accessed through a 1 . The valuations are as follows. First, for the actions: for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 N + 2 and
, where c is the last letter of w. Now, for the proposition
Observe that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2 N }, t i and t j share the same underlying tree, that we shall write τ : τ i = τ j = τ . Moreover, the labellings only differ on the leafs of τ ↓ y 2 N +1 and τ ↓ y 2 N +2 . Remark also that, since Agent a observes no atomic proposition, her uniform strategies are simply (infinite) sequences of actions. Also, for each i such that
ti,{ } , the acceptance game of A on t i with relation .
Lemma 12.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , 2 N }, Eve has a winning strategy in G i .
Proof. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , 2 N }. Agent a has a uniform strategy in G i for achieving Fp: it consists in playing a 0 a 0 w i a ω 0 . Therefore t i , , |= a Fp, hence t i ∈ L(A, ). This precisely means that Eve has a winning strategy in G i .
Let us take one winning strategy σ i for Eve in each game
Q , which maps each node of τ to the set of states in which σ i visits this node:
N , the set visit σi (y 2 N +1 ). Since there are at most 2 |Q| different such sets of states, and we have 2 N strategies with N = |Q| + 1, there must exist i = j s.t. visit σi (y 2 N +1 ) = visit σj (y 2 N +1 ). For the rest of the proof we fix such a pair (i, j). We now consider the tree-arena t 0 that consists in t i where the subtree t i ↓ y 2 N +1 is replaced with t j ↓ y 2 N +1 (see Figure 1) . Let us write G 0 for G A t0,{ } . Observe that the three games G i , G j and G 0 share the same set of positions:
, that we now write . Because positions of the form (y k , q, δ(q, )) play an important role in the following, we let v q k := (y k , q, δ(q, )). We first establish the following crucial lemma, which allows us to transfer the existence of winning strategies in positions v q k from G i and G j to G 0 (see Appendix A for the proof).
Lemma 13.
For all
Observe that, in t 0 , Agent a has a non-uniform strategy to achieve Fp, but no uniform one. Therefore, t 0 , , |= a Fp, and thence t 0 / ∈ L(A, ). By definition of the acceptance for jumping automata, Eve does not have a winning strategy in G 0 . We prove the following proposition and obtain a contradiction, which terminates the proof of Theorem 11.
Proposition 14.
Eve has a winning strategy in G 0 .
Proof sketch.
We give an intuition on how a winning strategy σ 0 for Eve in G 0 can be obtained. The detail can be found in Appendix B. Let us define Start τ = { , x 1 , . . . , x 2 N +2 }, the two first levels of τ , and 
, and by Proposition 2 we obtain that Eve also has a winning strategy from v
, and therefore it is a winning position for Eve in G j . Again, by Point 2 of Lemma 13, 
Conclusions
We have investigated in the expressive power of the epistemic µ-calculus by comparing it with jumping automata and ATL i . For the first comparison, we have shown that, like in the classic case, L K µ is expressively equivalent to alternating jumping tree automata. Next, we have shown that ATL i may express properties not expressible in L K µ , when interpreted with synchronous perfect-recall semantics. We have also shown that L K µ has a decidable satisfiability problem when the semantics relies on recognizable relations, i.e. bounded-memory semantics.
From the first two results above, one may prove that the monadic second order logic on trees, enriched with the equal-level predicate (MSO eqlevel ) [19] , is strictly more expressive than L K µ : on the one hand, for each jumping automaton, one may build an equivalent MSO eqlevel formula, by appropriately encoding Eve's winning strategies in the automaton. On the other hand, it is not hard to see that MSO eqlevel may encode any ATL i formula. These results strengthen the common belief that there exists no "fixpoint" axiomatization of ATL i , contrary to what is known for ATL with perfect information, where the coalition operators have fixpoint expansions.
We plan to further investigate the impact of these results on a theory of jumping automata and their relation with MSO with the equal-level predicate, or other binary predicates. We conjecture that languages of jumping automata are not closed under existential quantifications. We also plan to identify a generalization of jumping automata which would be expressively equivalent (modulo bisimulations) to MSO with additional predicates. On the other hand, our non-expressiveness proof relies on the synchronous perfect recall setting, and we do not have an easy generalization to the case of non-synchronous perfect recall semantics, or to other types of semantics based on non-recognizable indistinguishability relations.
A
Proof of Lemma 13 Lemma 
13.

For all
Proof. For convenience, for v, v ∈ V and k ∈ {0, i, j}, we shall write v → k v if (v, v ) ∈ E k . We start with point 1. Let us define the binary relation Z ⊆ V 0 × V i as the smallest relation such that, for all q ∈ Q and all α ∈ B + (Dir × Q):
We prove that Z is a bisimulation between G 0 and G i . Take First, for colour harmony: by definition of the colours in acceptance games, it holds that
Now, for Zig, take u ∈ V such that v → 0 u. According to the possible moves in the semantic games (see Section 2.4), this move is of one of the three following kinds: 1. it decomposes α without moving in the tree nor changing state, 2. it goes down to a child of x in a state q , or 3. it jumps to a node y such that x y in a state q .
Case 1:
We have u = (x, q, β), where β is some subformula of α. According to the definition of semantic games, this move is also possible in G i : v → i u. Therefore, we let u = u. Because we have (x, q, α )Z(x , q, α ) for some α = α, by definition of Z, it is true for all α , and in particular (x, q, β)Z(x , q, β). Finally, uZu .
Case 2: We have α = q or α = q , u = (y, q , δ(q , 0 (y))) for some child y of x; write β := δ(q , 0 (y)) and y := x · c, where c ∈ {0, 1}.
First, observe that by definition of Z, x and x are at the same level (|x| = |x |), and therefore if x · c exists in τ , so does x · c. It follows, by definition of semantic games,
We distinguish three possibilities again, according to the definition of Z and the fact that (x, q, α)Z(x , q, α).
x = x . We have y = x · c = x · c. By definition of Z, we obtain that y / ∈ τ ↓ y 2 N +1 , so that 0 (y) = i (y). Therefore β = β , and u = u , which, by definition of Z, entails that uZu . x = y 2 N +1 · w for some w. Because vZv , we have x = y j · w. By observing t 0 and t i , we obtain that 0 (y 2 N +1 · w · c) = i (y j · w · c), so β = β , and again, by definition of Z, uZu . x = y i · w for some w. Because vZv , we have that x = y 2 N +1 · w. Again, it holds that
, and by definition of Z, uZu .
Case 3:
We have α = q or α = q for some q , u = (y, q , β) for some x y and β = δ(q , 0 (y)). By definition of Z, |x| = |x |, and because Agent a is blind, the nodes reachable from x and x through coincide (they are all the nodes at the same level). We therefore hace |x| = |x | = |y|. We distinguish two cases.
y ∈ τ ↓ y k for some k = 2 N + 1: since |x | = |y|, we have that x y, and therefore the move v → i (y, q , δ(q , i (y))) = u is legal in G i . Now, because 0 (y) = i (y), u = u , hence uZu . y ∈ τ ↓ y 2 N +1 : let y = y 2 N +1 · w for some w. We have that |y j · w| = |y 2 N +1 · w| = |y| = |x |, hence x y j · w, and therefore v → i (y j · w, q , δ(q , i (y j · w))) = u is a valid move in G i . And because 0 (y 2 N +1 · w) = i (y j · w), δ(q , i (y j · w)) = β, and therefore uZu .
For Zag, the proof is almost the same, making use of the third point in the the definition of Z instead of the second one for simulating the moves of G i that jump in τ ↓ y 2 N +1 .
So Z is a bisimulation between G 0 and G i and, clearly, for all q ∈ Q, for k = 2 N + 1, (y k , q, δ(q, (y k )))Z(y k , q, δ(q, (y k )) The only difference is that now, the moves that must be avoided are those that jump in τ ↓ y 2 N +2 , which is the part that differs between t 0 and t j . The rest of the proof is just the same as for the first point.
B
Proof of Proposition 14 Proposition 14. Eve has a winning strategy in G 0 .
Proof. We define a strategy σ 0 for Eve in G 0 , and we prove that it is a winning strategy. 
